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./ 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
OGDEN CITY, a Municipal Corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs.-
PUBLIC SERVICE COl\IMISSION OF 
UTAH, a body politic and UTAH 
POWER & LIGHT COMPANY, a 
corporation, 
Defendants. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This is an action by Ogden City for itself and other 
municipalities similarly situated to review and annul 
an order of the Public Service Commission ordering that 
the defendant Utah Power and Light Company 
''Shall state on customer's hill and collect as 
a separate item on a pro rata basis from its 
customers in any municipality wherein is im-
posed any municipal franchise, occupation, sales 
or license tax.'' 
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This order was entered upon the Commission's own 
motion in a proceeding upon application by the Company 
for Commission approval of proposed E~lectric Service 
Rate Schedules, a proceeding designated by the Com-
mission as its Case No. 3780. No question is raised as 
to the validity of the other orders entered therein. 
For the credit and honor of the Company it must 
be said that it opposed the making of this order upon 
the stated ground that compliance therewith would con-
stitute a breach of faith with Ogden City and other 
franchise granting cities, and would he a violation of 
its franchise contracts. (R. 673-5 ). 
The Commission's order presently affects existing 
negotiated franchise contracts between the Company 
and Ogden, Salt Lake City and Sandy, in which the 
agreed rentals or fees are 2% of gross revenues from 
power sold within the city limits, and a 1% business 
licens.e tax levied by South Salt Lake on the business 
of distributing or selling electricity. There are also 
seven franchises with small cities, for which total annual 
fees of $468.00 are paid. (R. 253). 
This hrief will address itself to the problem pres-
ented in the case of Ogden City, hut it appears that the 
controlling principales are equally applicable to the 
problems of the other franchise cities. Moreover, all 
of the arguments presented except those relating to the 
status of the franchise agreements as contracts apply 
with equal force to the situation of the South Salt Lake 
business tax. 
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On ~Iarrh 14. 1951, pursuant to pre,·ions negotia-
tions with the Company (R. ~3~), Og·den City adopted 
an Ordinanre granting to the l \)nlpan:· the right or 
franchise to use the city streets for its power transmis-
sion lines for a period of 30 ~·pars from January 1, 1951. 
(R. 229). Section 5 thereof provides that 
• ·As a further consideration for this fran-
chise and in lieu of all municipal occupation or 
license taxes upon the Company, its property or 
business within the City, the Company agrees to 
pay a sum equal to two percentum (2%) of the 
gross revenue derived by the Company from the 
sale and use of electrical power and energy with-
in the corporate limits of the City.'' (R. 230---
emphasis supplied.) 
Section 7 thereof provides that 
"Utah Power & Light Company within thirty 
days after the effective date of this Ordinance 
shall file its acceptance thereof in writing with 
the City Recorder of Ogden, otherwise the same 
shall be null and void. (R. 230-emphasis 
supplied.) 
By Section 8 it was provided that upon such accep-
tance the franchises under which .the Company and its 
predecessors had been using the City streets for more 
than 40 years should be repealed. ( R. 230-231). 
The Company accepted the offer and grant con-
tained in the Ordinance and procured from the Com~ 
mission a certificate of Convenience and Necessity to 
exercise the franchise so granted. (R. 232---4). The 
contract was complete, and the parties began their oper-
ations thereunder. 
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Then on March 26, 1952, the Company filed new rate 
schedules for electric power to be furnished by it, with 
an application for the Commission's approval thereof. 
(R. 1-5; 98-158). TheApplication was heard by the 
Commission in May and June, 1952. Previous to this 
time the franchise fees had been ''absorbed'' as a gen-
eral operating expense, paid out of the Company's 
general operating revenues. (R. 510; 512; 514). The 
Company proposed to continue this practice. 
However, at the hearing the question of the hand-
ling of the municipal franchise fees and license taxes 
was raised by Counsel for the Commission (R. 509, et 
seq.) and the Commission Chairman indicated that the 
Commission thought the public would be better informed 
as to franchise taxes if the tax was billed separately 
to the public and that such action would stop the levying 
of municipal franchise taxes. (R. 676). 
The Company, however, reported that it had, in 
negotiating the franchises, represented to the franchise 
cities, including Ogden, that the franchise fees would 
not be imposed (or ''passed on'' to) the inhabitants of 
the franchise cities, and that the Company had engaged 
in an implied undertaking with the cities not to do so. 
(R. 673-4). It objected to the proposal that it violate 
this undertaking and charge back to the inhabitants the 
moneys it was supposed to pay the city for their benefit. 
G. M. Gadsby, for many years the President and 
General Manager of the Company, was the only witness 
examined as to the franchise fees and their bearing on 
the company's rate structure. 
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He testified in effect that in negotiating the fran-
chise contracts it was the intention of the Company to 
''absorb'' the franchise fees, and not to bill the customers 
for the amount thereof. (R. 510-51-l- ). 
He also testified that the net effect of the franchise 
tax transactions 'nts too small to have really affected 
the question of rates at all, and that had their earnings · 
been maintained as they were in 1950, the increase in 
Franchise fees could haYe been absorbed by the Com-
pany without any rate increase. (R. 511). Obviously 
other factors brought about the Company's request for 
a rate incrtase. 
The Company has what ~Ir. Gadsby referred to as 
a "postage stamp" type of rate; that is it charges all 
consumers everywhere exactly the same rate for the 
same service. ( R. 526). 
In the franchise granting cities there is a "greater 
density of customers;'' there are relatively more cus-
tomers per mile of line or $100.00 of investment. 
(R. 526-7). The relative cost of serving the urban 
customer is therefore lower. 
As a result the ability of the Company to do bus-
iness in Ogden and the other franchise cities is of benefit 
to the customers over the whole system. If the Company 
did not have the business in these larger communities, 
it could not serve the other communities at the now pre-
vailing rates. The larger communities make a positive 
financial contribution to the rates charged aU customers.-
Mr. Gadsby testified under oath that although he could 
not tell whether that contribution was equivalent to a 2% 
or a 5%, it is something. (R. 527). 
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There is no evidence to the contrary anywhere in 
the record. 
In other words, because the rates are the same, and 
the cost and investment incident to serving the urban 
customers are lower, the urban customers in the fran-
chise cities are already "carrying on their backs" the 
customers outside these urban areas-perhaps to an 
even greater extent than the maximum 2% franchise 
fees. 
Moreover, as Mr. Gadsby pointed out, the great 
business stability and security which results from long 
term franchises makes the Company's bonds more at-
tractive, so that they can be marketed at a lower rate of 
interest, thus lowering expenses to the ultimate benefit 
of the ratepayers. (R. 527). 
The Company's President also testified that in the 
negotiation of a franchise the Company would have 
something to say about the amount and would not agree 
to pay an exorbitant charge. (R. 529). There is no 
contradiction in the record. 
Exhibit 23 (R. 222) prepared by the Company's 
Auditor, Mr. Jones, was introduced in evidence (R. 666). 
It shows that the total of all municipal levies as applied 
to 1951 revenues was $178,423 of which $99,607 repre-
sented recent increases almost entirely attributable to 
increased franchise fees payable under the newly ne-
gotiated long term franchise agr;eements with Ogden 
and Salt Lake City. It also shows that the net increases, 
after allowing an adjustment for decrease in income 
taxes resulting from this additional expense, was only 
$46,517. This amonnt obviously could have only a 
:negligable affect on the overall rates. Other factors 
compelled the application of an increase, as is clearly 
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sho"·n by a comparison of this figun• with the figures 
sho·wn by the Company·~ comparatiYe income statement, 
Exhibit 16, (R. 196) "·hich shows, for example, an in-
crease of allowable operating reYenue deductions of 
$~,98:2, 197 for the yt>ar ending· ~larch 31, 1952, over the 
year ending December 31, 1949. 
The matter being submitted, the Commission on 
July 29, 1952, made and entered its Report, Findings 
and Order ( R. 15-30). · Section 9 of the Report deals 
with the problem here under consideration. (R. 24-
25 ). It reads: 
The applicant's expenses for the year 1951 
include franchise taxes charged by Salt Lake 
City, Ogden, Sandy City, and South Salt Lake. 
These franchise taxes are imposed at the rate of 
two per cent of the gross receipts for electricity 
sold within the corporate limits in Salt Lake 
City, Ogden, and Sandy City, and one per cent 
of the sales in South Salt Lake. Based upon 
1951 sales the amount of the franchise tax in the 
four cities referred to is $178,423. The position 
of the applicant is that such tax expenses should 
be included by it in its overall expenses, and in 
turn, should be charged against all rate payers 
in the State. The Commission is of the opinion 
that such method of charging the tax is unfair 
to the rate payer residing outside of the cities 
imposing such taxes, and would eneourage all 
cities served by applicant to levy as high a fran-
chise tax as is possible and require rate payers 
who are not residents of the particular city to 
help pay the taxes for the upkeep of such eity. 
The commission is of the further opinion that it 
is better public policy to have the citizens and 
rate payers conscious of all taxes being levied 
by the local municipalities. The Commission 
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finds, therefore, that such taxes should be filed 
separately and charged against the rate payers 
of the municipalities which levy such taxes. This 
Commission has previously adopted a similar 
policy in former hearings before it concerning 
both the Mountain States Telephone and Tele-
graph Company and the Mountain Fuel Supply 
Company. 4/ Nothing was introduced into the 
present case which would cause the Commission 
to change its policy as to the method of charging 
and collecting such taxes. It will follow that in 
the event any city lowers or removes these city 
levies, electric rates will be reduced accordingly 
within that city. 
In Section 10 of the Report (R. 25-27) the Com-
mission considered in detail the effect upon net return 
of various changes in operating expense which had 
occurred or which would take place as a result of the 
Commission's order. One of these factors was the 
decrease in operating expense resulting from the trans-
fer of the charge for franchise fees from the Company 
to its customers in the franchise cities. The Commission 
(R. 27) says: 
The other adjustments heretofore discussed, 
and their effect upon the Utah operating income 
for 1951 may be summarized as follows: 
Decrease in Federal 
energy tax $334,116 
Adjustment for fran-
chise taxes - 178,423 $512,539 
(Note: Handled as a decrease) 
Increase in wages $207,260 
Increase in purchased power 178,192 387,452 
Net adjustment (decrease in expenses ) $127,087 
4/ Re: The Mountain States Tel. and Tel. Co., I & S Docket No. 83 
Decided May 5, 1952; 
:Re: Mountain F'uel Supply Company, Case No. 3755 
Decided April 30, 1952 
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A decrease of $127,087 in operating Pxpenses 
would increase the Federal income tax by 52 per 
cent of such amount, or $66,085. There would 
be a net increase of $61,002, therefore, in the 
operating income of $4,980,156, changing such 
figure to $5,0-!1,158. 
It is notable that the Commission handled this 
item as a decrease in expense and not as an increase in 
the local rates. 
The finding· and order excludes the Franchise taxes 
both from the revenues and from the expenses of the 
Company. 
The franchise taxes are no longer recovered as a part 
of the charges made for electrical service, and then 
paid out as a Company expense; they are collected from 
the consumers within the franchise cities as a separate 
tax item, and then turned over to the cities without 
affecting either revenue or expense accounts on the 
Company's books. The Company bas become, as to 
these taxes, a mere collection agent for the cities, and 
the burden of the tax is shifted from the Company to 
its customers in the franchise cities. 
That this is in compliance with the intention of the 
Commission is made clear by the Commission's approval 
(R. 32) of the New Rate Schedules (Exhibit 40, R. 838-
896) filed pursuant to the Findings and Order. These 
approved rate schedules make no provision whatsoever 
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for the recovery of the taxes as a part of the electrical 
service charges. The taxes are treated as an extraneous 
collateral item, not as a part of the electric service rates. 
The Commission having, upon the findings quoted, 
made the Order complained of, Ogden City in due time 
served and filed its petition for a rehearing (R. 34-42). 
On August 27, 1952, the Commission denied the 
petition (R. 43), whereupon this 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
Point 1. The order of the Commission is beyond 
the Commission's jurisdiction, power and authority. 
Point 2. There is no evidence to support the mate-
rial findings of Section 9 of the Commission's Report 
and Findings of Fact. 
Point 3. The report and findings of the Commis-
sion do not support its order. 
Point 4. The order of the Commission impairs the 
obligation of the company's franchise contract with the 
city and its inhabitants in violation of Article I, Section 
10, Clause 1 of the Constitution of the United States 
and Article I, Section 18 of the Constitution of Utah. 
Point 5. The order of the Commission, by author-
izing a specific and arbitrary setoff, releases and ex-
tinguishes at least in part the indebtedness, liability 
and obligation of the company to the city under its 
franchise contract in violation of Article VI, Sections 
27 and 29 of the Constitution of Utah. 
10 
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Point 6. The order of the Commission unlawfully 
attempts to exercise power to superYise and interfere 
with municipal money and property and to levy muni-
cipal taxes and perform municipal functions which can-
not lawfully be granted the Commission under Article 
VI, Section 29 and Artie le XII, Section 8 of the consti-
tution of Utah. 
Point 7. The order of the Commission unlawfully 
transforms a lawful and proper franchise fee exacted 
from the company into an unlawful tax on the purchase 
or use of electrical power in violation of Article VI, 
Section 29, Article XI, Section 5 (a) and Article XIII, 
Section 5 of the Constitution of Utah. 
Point 8. The only case approving the passing on 
of a franchise fee is distinguishable. The other cases 
support the city's position. 
ARGU11ENT 
General Considerations 
This case represents the culmination of a policy 
with respect to the imposition of the burden of municipal 
franchise fees and license taxes which the Commission 
apparently resolved upon some time in 1951. As the 
Commission said in its findings, 
''This Commission bas previously adopted 
a similar policy in former hearings before it con-
cerning both the Mountain States Telephone and 
Telegraph Company and the Mountain Fuel 
Supply Company.'' 
11 
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By a footnote to its findings (R. 25) the Commission 
referred to its decision re, the Mountain States Tele-
phone and Telegraph Company, I & S Docket No. 83, 
decided May 5, 1952, which is now pending before this 
Court on certiorari, and its opinion re, Mountain Fuel 
Supply Company, Case No. 3755, decided April 30, 1952. 
It is interesting to note the development and pro-
gress of the Commission's policy and theory with respect 
to municipal taxation and franchise contract fees. In 
the ~iountain Fuel Supply Company case the Commis-
sion authorized the utility to "pass on" to the consumer 
within the municipalities all municipal license taxes and 
franchise fees imposed after the entry of the order. No 
attempt was made to disturb existing franchise con-
tracts. In the ~iountain States Telephone and Tele-
graph Company case the Commission granted the 
utility's application for authority to pass on these 
taxes and fees to consumers within the municipality, 
including those paid pursuant to the obligation of ex-
isting franchise contracts. In the case now before the 
Court the Commission has taken the last step : It has, 
against the protest and over the objection of the utility, 
required the utility to pass on to its consumers within 
the municipalities in question all municipal franchise 
fees and license taxes under existing as well as future 
contracts. 
It must at the offset be observed that there is no 
specific statutory authority and it is admitted that there 
can he no statutory authority for such action by the 
Commission. The Commission has set itself up as a 
policy establishing body for the state with respect to 
the handling of municipal taxes on public utilities. 
12 
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Only threr rourts of last resort have had occasion 
to consider the question of "·hether a public service 
commission may properly authorize a public utility 
to pass on its municipal franchise fees and license taxes 
to the consumers within the municipalities concerned. 
The eases are : 
and 
City of Elmhurst YS. Western United Gas 
Company 
(Illinois, 1936) 
1 Northeastern 2nd 144 ; 
State vs. Department of Public Service 
(Washington, 1943) 
142 Pac. 2nd 498, 532, 536, Syllabi 44-45; 
State vs. Public Service Commission 
(Missouri, 1952) 
245 S. W. 2nd 851. 
The :Missouri case last above cited is the only case 
clearly and definitely in point here and it was there that 
the order of the Commission directing the municipal 
levies in question to be passed on to the consumers with-
in the respective municipalities was void 
In the Washington case the Supreme Court of that 
state distinguished between franchise fees and license 
taxes and held that the Commission could not order the 
franchise fees passed on to the consumers within the 
franchise cities, but approved the order of the Com-
mission in so far as it authorized license taxes to be 
passed on. The fact is, as will be hereinafter demon-
strated, the case at Bar is stronger than either the 
Washington case or the Missouri case as regards fran-
chise fees and the Washington case is distinguishable 
from the case at Bar in so far as it affects license taxes. 
13 
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The Elmhurst case from Illinois approved an order 
directing franchise fees and license taxes to be passed 
on, but it is clearly distinguishable upon the facts from 
the case at Bar and many objections are here raised 
that were not there urged. We expect to demonstrate 
in this brief that on reason and authority the order of 
the Commission below in this case is unlawful and void. 
POINT 1. The order of the Commission is beyond 
the Commission's jurisdiction, power and authority. 
The Commission has boldly and openly usurped 
the policy making prerogatives of the Legislature. It 
recognized that it was fixing and detrmining policy. 
In its report (R. 25) the Commission said: 
'' The Commission is of the further opinion 
that it is better public policy to have the citizens 
and taxpayers conscious of all taxes being levied 
by the local municipalities. The Commission 
finds, therefore, that such taxes should be billed 
separately and charged against the rate payers 
of the municipalities which levy such taxes.'' 
(Emphasis supplied) 
The Commission obviously did not inadvertently 
drift into policy making while it was concerned with 
rate making. It has with its eyes open declared that it 
is fixing policy for the State of Utah. 
It must be observed that no such policy as the Com-
mission seeks to establish has ever before been recog-
nized in the State of Utah. On the contrary under the 
provisions of Article XIII, Section 5 and Article XII, 
Section 8 of the Constitution of Utah and the statutes 
enacted by the Legislature thereunder the matters of 
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municipal taxation and the granting of municipal fran-
chises to electrical power utilities have been considered 
entirely within the prerogatiYe of the Legislature of 
the state and of the legislati,·e bodies of the munici-
palities, to whom the people and the Legislature have 
in part delegated their legislatiYe and policy making 
powers in this regard. The policy which has been un-
iformally established and followed since statehood has 
been that municipal franchise fees and license taxes 
should be considered as a general expense of the utility 
to whom they were levied and should be paid out of their 
general funds and not passed on to their consumers as 
a separate tax item on their bills. The Commission, as 
shown by the record here, has heretofore recognized 
and followed that established policy. The Legislature 
bas met many times with full knowledge of the policy 
that has been pursued and has never seen fit to pass 
any law changing the established policy. It therefore 
must be presumed to have approved that policy. Under 
the Constitution and Laws of Utah the cities have au-
thority to grant franchises to utilities and to impose 
conditions. Clearly the determination of the amount of 
a city franchises fee, or of a city occupation tax, and 
of the person upon whom the burden thereof shall be 
imposed, is a matter of municipal policy. In fixing 
such policy the local authorities are not subject to cont-
rol, direct or indirect, of the Commission. They are 
controlled only by general law and the Constitution. 
Matters of public policy are not for the Commission. 
Union Pacific Railroad Company vs. Public 
Service Commission 103 Utah 186, 200-
203, 134 Pae. 2nd 469; 
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Idaho Power Company vs. Thompson 19 
Federal 2nd 54 7, 580. 
As we have indicated, Ogden's franchise with the 
company is clearly established as one in the nature of 
a fifty year contract leasing to the company the pri-
vilege of using the city's public streets and alleys for 
pole lines, transmission cables, ete., in the prosecution 
of the company's private business which it very pro-
perly conducts for private profit. This is a privilege 
which no private person or corporation may enjoy as 
of right. It may be enjoyed only upon special grant 
from the sovereign in U tab, the sovereign people. These 
concepts are fundamental, and in accord with the author-
ities generally. See 
Utah Light and Traction Company vs. 
Public Service Commission 
101 Utah 99, 118 Pac. 2nd 683, 689. 
23 Am. J ur. ''Franchises,'' § § 2 to 8, pp. 
714 to 720; and 
37 C. J. S. "Franchises," §§ 1 to 14, pp. 141 
to 158. 
In Utah, the people have delegated to the local au-
thorities the exclusive right to grant this privilege to 
electric companies as to city streets, and have specifi-
cally forbidden the legislature to grant any such right 
without the consent of local authority. The sovereign 
people, in Article XII, Section 8 of the Constitution 
of Utah, have declared that 
"No law shall be passed granting the right 
to construct and operate a ..... telephone or 
electric light plant within any city .... without 
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the con~ent of the Lwa1 authorities who have 
control of the street or highway proposed to be 
occupied for such purposes.'' 
This court has held that, eYen assuming that this 
constitutional provision has no application to inter-
urban railroads, a muicipality clearly has the right to 
grant or lcithhold the right to the use of the streets 
therein, and thus to impose conditions respecting the 
'llSe thereof for purposes other thau the right of ordinary 
travel thereon. 
Shortino vs. Salt Lake and U. R. Co., 
52 t:tah 476, 488; 174 Pae. 860. 
The Legislature has, perhaps superfluously, im-
plemented this right granted cities by the Constitution. 
In 
Section 10-8-14, U. C. A., 1953, 
(Section 15-8-14, U. C. A., 1943), 
it has provided that 
And in 
"They (the City Commission) may construct, 
maintain and operate .... electric light works .. 
. . or authorize the construction, maintenance 
and operation of the same by others ..... " 
Section 10-8-13, U. S. A., 1953, 
(Section 15-8-13, U. C. A., 1943), 
it has provided that 
''They may regulate the. . . . . use of streets 
" 
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In the ease of 
1_Tnion Pac. R. Company vs. Public Service 
Commission, 
103 Utah 186; 134 Pac. 2nd 469 
(Syllabi 7, 8 and 9), 
this Court held that, under the constitutional and sta-
tutory grants of power to cities, a city may impose terms 
and conditions upon its grant of a franchise, and re-
voke the franchise for breach thereof. It further held 
that, although the provisions of a franchise agreement 
with respect to rates are subordinate to the Commis-
sion's exclusive control of rates, in all other matters 
respecting franchise for the special use of city streets 
the city's powers and rights are not in any way subject 
to the cotrol of the Commission. The Court commented 
that inasmuch as it construed the Public Utilities Act 
as not granting the Commission any jurisdiction over 
city street franchises, no question is presented of dele-
gation of municipal functions to a special commission 
in violation of Section 29, Article VI of the Constitution 
That section provides that, 
"The Legislature shall not relegate to any 
special commission .... any power to make, super-
vise or interfere with any municipal .... money, 
property or effects, whether held in trust or 
otherwise, to levy taxes, .... or to perform any 
municipal functions.'' 
It is clear that the establishment of public policy 
with respect to franchises to use city streets is a muni-
cipal function vested by the Constitution anl laws of 
Utah in the legislative authority of the municipalities, 
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and the Commissil)n in attempting to overrule and re-
verse the policy established by the legisativc authority 
is exceeding its jurisdiction and power and its order is 
void. 
It is equally clear that, in using Og·den 's streets and 
the streets of her sister cities, the Company is enjoying 
a special privilege which it could not enjoy except by 
consent of and arrangement \Yith the local representa-
tives of the inhabitants. These streets have been opened, 
improved and maintained by the inhabitants, either by 
special assessment levied on the abutting property own-
ers or by general tax levy on all property owners within 
the corporate limits. The streets belong to the cities' 
inhabitants. In using the streets for electric power lines, 
the company imposes thereon a special burden, and en-
joys a special privilege which no other inhabitant or 
taxpayer enjoys. It is only proper that it should com-
pensate the inhabitants for suffering tba.t burden and 
granting that privilege. 
That is a very proper policy firmly established by 
the Constitution and statutes of Utah. It bas been 
recognized by the decisions of this Court above cited. 
Moreover, by Article XIII, Section 5 of the Consti-
tution the Legislature is forbidden to levy any city, town 
or other municipal tax, but is authorized to vest such 
power in the local authorities. By Article VI, Section 
29, above referred to, the Legislature is forbidden to 
authorize any special commission to levy any such tax. 
Pursuant to these provisions of the Constitution the 
Legislature has authorized cities to license and tax all 
businesses. Thus, by the Constitution and laws of the 
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state power to establish public policy with respect to 
license taxes on business conducted within municipali-
ties is clearly vested in the municipal authorities and 
not in the public service commission. The right to es-
tablish policy in this regard obviously includes the right 
to establish as a policy the identity of the taxpayer upon 
whom the burden of the tax, as a tax, shall be imposed. 
The local authorities (in this case the South Salt Lake 
City Commission) have asserted that power and deter-
mined the policy. The taxes are payable by the comp-
any, according to the ordinance, and the commission has 
power or authority to transfer the burden of that tax 
in violation of the policy established pursuant to the 
Constitution and Statutes of Utah. 
The order of the Commission clearly is contrary to 
established public policy in Utah and attempts to estab-
lish a policy exactly contrary to the one already fixed 
and recognized. This is clearly beyond the jurisdiction 
of the Commission and its order in this regard is void 
and should be set aside by the Court. 
Furthermore, under the provisions of Section 54-
4-4, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 (Section 76-4-4, Utah 
Code Annotated, 1943) prescribing the powers of the 
Commission to regulate rates, regulations, practices, 
etc., of utilities, the Commission has power to order or 
authorize a change in a practice or rate only when sub-
stantial evidence is presented to prove and the Com-
mission finds that the existing practices or rates are in-
herently ''unjust, unreasonable, discriminatory or pre-
ferential'," or in violation of law. 
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In the case of 
~fountain States Telephone and Telegraph 
Company Ys. Public Service Commission 
105 Utah 230; 142 Pac. 2nd 873, 
rehearing denied, 105 Utah 266, 271; 145 
Pac. 2nd 790, 792, 
this court held that an order adjusting rates of a public 
utility is invalid unless based on evidence, "calculated 
to show that existing intrastate rates were inherently 
unreasonable.'' The proponents of any change 
in existing rates or pr3;ctices must prove this jurisdic-
tional fact. In the absence of proof of this jurisdictional 
fact the Commission has no jurisdiction to order a 
change in the existing practice, and the order is outside 
the authority of the Commission and void. 
The order in this case should be set aside as void 
and beyond the jurisdiction and authority of the Com-
mission which entered it. 
POINT 2. There is no evidence to support material 
findings of Section 9 of the Commission's report and 
findings of fact. 
Throughout that portion of the hearing in which 
the question of franchise fees and license taxes was under 
consideration, the Commission assumed that the pay-
ment of varying franchise fees and license taxes as gen-
eral expenses of the company was "unfair" to the rate 
payers residing outside the cities in question. Assum-
ing, without conceding, that such an "unfairness" 
rendered the practice "unjust, unreasonable, discri-
minatory or preferential,'' as required by the statute, 
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still there is no evidence in the record to prove that as-
sumption as a fact, and it remains a bald and unsup-
ported assumption. 
Indeed all of the evidence in the record is to the 
effect that the treatment of the franchise fees as a 
general expense payable out of the genral revenues 
of the company is fair and just and tends properly and 
equitably to distribute the burden among all of the rate 
payers. It will be recalled that Mr. Gadsby's testi-
mony (and it was the only testimony before the Com-
mission) was to the effect that while rates in and out 
of the franchise granting cities were identical, in genral 
the costs of serving the consumers within the franchise 
granting cities were materially less, and, furthermore, 
the license to do business in the larger, more thickly 
populated urban areas contributed to the financial sta-
bility of the company to such an extent that it could 
borrow money a.t more favorable rates, and that these 
benefits were reflected in the rates throughout the 
system, so that the company's franchises and licenses 
to do business in these urban areas in fact resulted in 
a substantial benefit to the consumers outside the muni-
cipalities. As he said, he did not know whether this 
benefit amounted to 2% or 5%, hut it was something. 
The payment of the franchise fees and license taxes to 
these larger municipalities is obviously a fair and rea-
sonable adjusting factor in this case, and the existing 
practice of paying these fees out of the general funds 
of the company as a general expense is not unfair. 
It must be observed, however, that clearly the bur-
den of proving the facts which would grant the Com-
mission jurisdiction to order a change in the existing 
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practice "·as on the Commission which on its own mo-
tion proposed the rhangt>. EYen if the evidence had 
not been contrary to the finding, the finding is base~ 
on several assumptions, none of which find any support 
in the evidence. Let us consider them in turn. 
First, it was assumed that the payment of the fran-
chise fees, taxes, etc., out of the general funds of the 
company creates a difference in the burden of electric 
power rates. This, of course, is entirely unfounded. 
As the evidence shows, the rates of the company through-
out the state are absolutely identical for identical ser-
vice. The company has a ''postage stamp'' type of rate. 
Second, the Commission assumed, contrary to the 
evidence, that the consumers outside the franchise cities 
received no benefits from the payment of the franchise 
fees, etc., by the company, but that consumers within 
the frachise municipalities receive the benefit of these 
taxes when expended by the city. This assumption 
again is directly in the face of the only evidence before 
the Comission and contrary to reason. It must again 
be recalled that ~Ir. Gadsby, the President of the com-
pany, testified that the ability of the company to do bu-
siness in these urban localities enabled the company 
to give power to the consumers outside these cities at 
rates lower than it could otherwise have done and that 
therefore the outside consumers benefited thereby to 
the extent of 2 ~ or perhaps even 5% of their electric 
power bills. The Commission obviously looked at the 
wrong side of the problem and considered only the 
benefits accruig from the expenditure of tax moneys 
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by the city, and not to the benefits to the rate payers 
which the payment of these taxes by the company pur-
chase for them. 
In this connection it perhaps should be observed 
that in our urban civilization it is becoming increasingly 
evident that city dwellers are already paying a dispro-
portionate share of the tax load. There are many ex-
amples, but perhaps one will serve. City property 
owners pay county taxes to build rural roads as well as 
city taxes to pay for city roads. But the people out-
side of the cities pay no city taxes to build city roads 
upon which the power company may locate its power 
transmission lines. 
What the Commission is here attempting amounts 
to local rate making rather than state-wide rate mak-
ing and it proposes to base the local variations upon 
one item of expense, to-wit, the franchise fees and li-
cense taxes, and to make the cost of power vary with 
these changes. In so doing it made its third assump-
tion which is entirely without basis in fact and is con-
trary to the evidence. It assumed that all other ex-
penses of renderilng electric power throughout the state 
were equal and that these municipal charges, by which 
(as it further assumed) the city consumer alone bene-
/ fited, created the only inequality. ,\ 
The evidence is exactly to the contrary. Namely, 
that it is cheaper to serve consumers within the cities 
where these levies are made and that for this reason, 
if there is any unfairness, the unfairness operates 
against the cosumer within the cities in question. The 
estimate of the Company's President was that the dif-
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ference was so great, that it resulted in a rate benefit 
to the outside subscribers of from 2% to 5%, although 
he had no definite figures to submit. The highest fran-
chise is 2%. At the most, even if the Commission's 
other assumptions could be supported, the franchise 
fees could only offset the pre-existing unfairness against 
the consumers within the cities. 
The Commission obviously forced· the shoe on the 
wrong foot. If any rate differentials should be made, 
the people in the large urban centers should have the 
more favorable rates because, as the testimony shows, 
it cost less to serve them. 
We have found only one case in which a court of 
last resort has had occasion to review and pass upon 
the sufficiency of the evidence to support a claim that 
franchise fees discriminate against rural consumers. 
However, the facts there are so nearly identical to the 
facts in this case and the reasoning there adopted by 
the very learned and able Supreme Court of Missouri 
is so applicable and so cogent that we cannot forebear 
to examine and quote from it at some length. We believe 
it will be very helpful to the court and we submit. the 
principles there declared are controlling here. 
That case is 
State vs. Public Service Commission 
(Missouri, 1952) 
245 S. W. 2nd 851. 
There a privately owned utility, the St. Louis 
County Water Company, supplied water to sixty-six 
incorporated and numerous unincorporated areas in St. 
Louis County, 1fissouri. There, as here, the rates had 
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always been fixed on a system-wide "postage stamp" 
basis. Some sixteen of the incorporated areas levied 
special taxes upon the gross receipts of the company. 
Conceiving that these rates resulted in discrimination 
against consumers in non-taxing areas, the Missouri 
Public Service Commission there, as here, approved 
a new schedule of rates which there, as here, made no 
change in the basic rates, but added an amount equal 
to the gross receipt taxes to the bills of consumers with-
in the taxing municipalities. The Commission found 
that it was ''an unjust discrimination for the water 
consumers of one area to be burdened with any part of 
the taxes levied or payments exacted by another area,'' 
and ''that the consumers in any and all municipalities 
which seek to obtain revenue from such taxes or pay-
ments should bear the burden of providing such 
revenue.'' The Commission there, as here, ordered that 
all the municipal exactions, "whether in the nature of 
license taxes, occupation taxes, street rentals, fran-
chise payments'' or otherwise, should be paid by con-
sumers within the municipality receiving the same. 
In two aspects there is a difference between that 
case and the case at Bar, but in each instance the 
position taken by the Utah Commission is more patently 
erroneous and arbitrary than that taken by the Missouri 
Commission. The first difference is that the Missouri 
Commission held that the recovery of the municipal 
charges should be made "in the rates themselves" rather 
than by adding the same to the bill as a separate item, 
as was done by the U tab Commission. As we will point 
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. =-
out later in thit' brief, we belieYl' this alone would in-
Yalidate the action of the Utah Commission as being 
an interference \Yith the taxing power. 
In the second place, in the )lissouri case there was 
no direct testimony that tlle consumers outside the 
taxing cities receiYed a benefit from the privileges of 
doing business, and of using the streets, etc., which the 
company receiYed in return for the payment of the 
taxes, while in the case at Bar there is direct and 
positive testimony that the expenses of the company 
are less "\\-rithin the municipalities in question and that 
the outside consumers benefit thereby to the extent of 
2% to 5% of the cost to them of electric power. In this 
regard it is obvious that the cities' case before this 
Court stands upon a stronger foundation than did the 
cities' case before the Missouri Court. 
The ~Iissouri Court in that case observed that the 
Commission might have resorted to local rate making 
and classified the cities and towns and fixed rates on 
a unit basis, but that the company there was organized 
and operated on a system-wide basis, and all its pro-
perties, "irrespective of the conglomerate political 
subdivisions in its system, have been valued, and both 
rates and the right to a fair return have been determined 
upon that basis.'' That is equally true here . 
The Missouri Court declared, 
'' . . . . all taxes, including taxes on gross 
receipts, are a part of operating expense, . . . . 
and no doubt were and may be taken into con-
sideration by the Company when it becomes 
necessary to determine or redetermine rates or 
a fair return. 
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.... But regardless of the respective merits 
of the two methods of operation, the Company 
operates on the system-wide basis, and the Com-
mission has heretofore approved its rates and 
return on that basis, and both are now in the 
anomalous position of disregarding the system 
basis and treating this one item of operating 
expense upon a segregated, municipal unit basis." 
(Emphasis supplied.) 
This is also true in the case at Bar. 
The Court then examined the facts and the record 
to determine whether or not the payments to the munic-
ipalities did in fact result in discrimination. Attempting 
to prove disparity, the Company had submitted the 
following: 
1. Charts showing gross revenue per customer, 
and ranking the cities levying the tax; 
2. Charts ranking the tax levying cities by gross 
revenue per mile; and 
3. Charts ranking the tax levying areas with re-
spect to revenue received from such areas as compared 
to taxes paid. 
The Commission found that in 24 of the 66 cities 
served, about 75% of the revenue came from the taxing 
cities. But there were no charts~ showing total gross 
receipts, or net income, nor any d&fnonstration that there 
was any impairment of the Company's fair return in 
the areas levying the tax. 
Obviously in the Missouri case a greater effort was 
made to prove discrimination than was made in the 
case before this Court, and the effort there failed. It 
should fail here. The :Missouri Court there says: 
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• • The Order and the Company'~ position 
erroneously prPsnppose that there was no dis-
crimination in the former uniform rates in the 
first place and, of coure, that assumption is with-
out foundation . . . . . 1t certainly costs the 
Company less to serYe some areas than it does 
others, and necessaril~· there is a corresponding 
discrimination inherent in uniform rates through-
out the system. In the areas that are less costly 
to serye there is undoubtedly a greater profit to 
the Company than in the more costly areas and 
that results in discrimination in rates in favor 
of the costly areas. If any of the municipalities 
levying the tax are in the less costly areas, the 
addition of the tax to their water rates obviously 
increases the burden of the discrimination. There 
is no data in this record from which precise in-
formation may be obtained, but for the most 
part the cities levying the tax are the greatest 
in density of population and contribute the 
greater sums to both the Company's gross and 
net revenue. Those areas in which the Company 
has a franchise or valuable contract rights cer-
tainly make the greater contribution to the 
Company's stability and successful operation. 
From an operational standpoint they are in a 
more favorable position for rate making purposes 
than some isolated, unincorporated area, or some 
other more costly area, and yet uniform rates 
ignore these disparities. In short, there is a 
disparity in the former uniform system wide 
rates and the discrimination is favorable, un-
doubtedly, to the more costly areas, and the 
taxes involved in this proceeding :may or may not 
shift that unfavorable disparity; from all tha.t 
appears in this record the taxes may have equal-
ized the previously existing inequalities. But if 
it does, it does not necessarily follow that the 
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amount of the resulting difference is precisely 
the amount of the tax, or that it exceeds the more 
favorable rate previously enjoyed by the more 
costly operational areas or, in short, that the dis-
crimination is unfair and unjust. 
''There is no reasonable basis upon this re-
cord for the Commission's finding and order; 
accordingly the judgment is reversed." (Em-
phasis added.) 
The case is obviously and exactly in point, and sup-
ports completely the position of the City herein. 
Moreover it is in c.omplete harmony with the principles 
established by our Utah Statutes and by this Court in 
the case of 
Mountain States Tel. and ,_rel Company vs. 
Public Service Commission, 105 Utah 
230, 142 Pac. 2nd 873; Rehearing denied, 
105 Utah 266, 145 Pac. 2nd 790, 
holding that a Commission order purporting to equalize 
rates is invalid unless based on ''evidence calculated 
to show that existing . . . rates were inherently 
unreasonable. ' ' 
The assumption that the assumed difference in 
burden is unfair to the rate payer outside the franchise 
cities is unjustified, and against the law and the evidence. 
The Commission made a third entirely unjustified 
assumption when it undertook to adjust the burden of 
the power company rate payers by passing on the fran-
chise fees and license taxes to the consumers within 
the city limits. It assumed that the assumed difference 
in burden. was exactly equal to the amount of the fee or 
tax in each municipality involved. This is obvious from 
30 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
the fact that the Commission purported to correct this 
unfairness by its order authorizing the exact amount 
of the tax to be passed on in the cities where imposed. 
It made no attempt to inquire as to possible compen-
sating factors, and indeed it ignored the positive 
evidence before it that there definitely were compen-
sating factors which, if anything, made the existing rate 
system unfair to i:he city consumers. It made no at-
tempt to inquire as to possible other compensating 
factors such as variations in labor cost, in ad valorem 
taxes, in building rentals or in easements for pole 
lines ad cables It made no inquiry as to whether or 
not there was in the several areas relative equality of 
return in proportion to the capital investment in prop-
erty used in serving such areas. 
This presumption just assumes the impossible. If 
rates are to be adjusted on a community level, evidence 
must be taken to establish a reasonable basis for the 
adjustment to be made in each community, and specific 
findings made for each community fixing the amount 
a.nd the direction of each adjustment. 
Finally the Commission assumed that there was 
no reasonable basis for the assumed difference in 
burden. It is, of course, recognized that differences in 
cost of service, in capital invested in rendering service, 
in service rendered and in operating conditions justify 
a difference in rate. If differences in operating con-
ditions, costs, etc. differ, then the rates also must differ 
and an exactly compensated, equal rate is unreasonable. 
Such was the rule established by this Court in M oun.ta.in 
States Telephone and Trle,qraph Company vs. Public 
Service Cnmm1"ssion, supra. Unless there is evidence to 
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show that a difference in burden is unreasonable, the 
Commission has no authority to attempt a correction. 
Here there was absolutely no evidence to show that the 
difference, if any exists, was unreasonable, but on the 
contrary the only evidence before the Commission 
showed clearly that the handling of the franchise fees 
and license taxes as a general expense of the company 
payable out of its general revenues was a fair, just and 
reasonable practice which did substantial justice as 
among all of the rate payers. As the order here is not 
based on any evidence showing that the present prac-
tices are unreasonable, it must fall under the authority 
of the Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Com-
pany case, supra. 
It is clear from a consideration of the principles 
considered in the Missouri case, supra, and of the 
evidence in this case that the Commission cannot fairly 
and justly make local rate differentials solely with 
regard to the cost of franchise fees or occupation taxes. 
We do not believe they can be "a little bit pregnant" 
with local rate making and still comply with the law. 
If rate structure must be re-examined on a local basis, 
as the Commission has here attempted, then the only 
fair and just method, and we submit the only legal 
method, is to re-examine all structures of rate making 
on a local basis upon the same principles as the same 
are now examined upon a system-wide basis. We do 
not advocate this, but as we say, it is impossible to make 
local differentials that will be fair unless all factors 
affecting the costs of power to the consumer are con-
sidered in establishing such differentials., 
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At any rate the Commission's present order di-
recting these municipal charges to be passed on to con-
sumers within the municipalities is not based on any 
evidence and it must be vacated. 
POIXT 3. The report and findings of the Commis-
sion do not support its order. 
As hereinbefore indicated, under the provisions of 
Section 5±-4--!, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, (formerly 
76--1--1, Utah Code Annotated, 1943), the Commission has 
no authority or jurisdiction to order a change in an 
existing rate practice unless it shall first find that the 
practice is ''unjust, unreasonable, discriminatory or 
preferential,'' or in violation of law. The only finding 
made in this regard \Yas that "the Commission is of the 
'opinion' that such method of charging the tax is' unfair' 
to the rate payer residing outside the cities imposing· 
such taxes, and would encourage all cities served by 
applicant to levy as high a franchise tax as possible 
..... '' The Commission has nowhere found as a fact 
that the existing practice is unjust, unreasonable, dis·-
criminatory, preferential or in violation of law. It has 
only stated an arbitrary opinion that the practice is 
unfair. 
It is obvious that this opinion as to the unfairness 
is not a finding as a fact that the rates are unjust with-
in the meaning and intent of the statute. If such 
"Unfairness" were to be held "unjust" as a matter of 
law, then it must follow that the payment as a general 
expense of local office rentals, ad valorem city taxes 
levied on property located within the cities, and the 
cost of obtaining private easements for power lines 
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would also be unjust, and it would be necessary in order 
to establish a lawful rate, to pass on all of these expenses 
pro rata to the persons residing within the particular 
area. This is obviously not what the Legislature had 
in mind, for expenses of all kinds inevitably vary from 
place to place and the Legislature had in mind only 
equal rates for equal service and did not intend to grant 
the Commission power to order local expeses passed 
on as a separate item to local consumers and this create 
a veritable chaos in the already complicated matter of 
fixing rates for public utilities. 
There are in law many inequalities which must be 
countenanced because their correction would so com-
plicate society that society could not bear the burden 
of the bureaucratic regulation of every item. It is sub-
mitted that the finding made by the Commission does 
not bring this case within the perview of the statute 
and the order is unsupported by any finding required 
by the statute and must be vacated. 
POINT 4. The order of the Commission impairs 
the obliga.tion of the company's franchise contract with 
the city and its inhabitants in violation of Article I, 
Section 10, Clause 1 of the Constitution of the United 
States and Article I, Se.ction 18 of the Constitution of 
Utah. 
It is apparent from what has been said before that 
the order of the Commission impairs the obligation of 
the Company upon its franchise contract made by Ogden 
City for the benefit of its inhabitants, the real parties 
in interest. It is therefore unconstitutional and void. 
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\Y e apprehend that Jwre ns in the telephone case 
~" now pending before this Court the Commission will 
raise two points in attempted answer: 
First, that the obligation of the franchise contract 
was not impaired, and second, that a city cannot claim 
the protection of these provisions of the national and 
state constitutions. It is submitted that neither answer 
has any validity here. 
In the first place it is here obvious that the city's 
inhabitants are the real parties in interest; the contract 
for the payment of a franchise fee was for their benefit. 
The franchise fees are intended to be expended by their 
representatives in furnishing them those municipal ser-
vices for which cities are organized. Let us consider 
whether or not the order has impaired this obligation 
or has deprived them of benefits. 
Before the Order, the Company paid their repre-
sentatives, out of its own funds, the amount of the fran-
chise fee, and it was expended by their public servants 
for their account and benefit. After the Order, it is 
true, the franchise fee will still be paid to the public 
servants of the inhabitants, to be expended for their 
benefit, but the obligation to make that payment has 
been lifted from the obligor Company and saddled upon 
the obligee inhabitants. The obligee has been forced to 
assume the obligation; the inhabitants have become both 
obligee and obligor; and the Company, formerly the 
obligor, has been relieved of all obligation except to act 
as agent to gather the franchise fee from the available 
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inhabitants and deliver it to their servants for expendi-
ture. The obligation of the Company has been whittled 
down from that of a debtor owing rentals for a special 
street privilege, to that of a mere collecting agent. 
It is as if the maker of a note were to be authorized 
to say to the payee, ''Of course I'll pay you-but only 
when and if I have extracted the wherewithall from 
your own pocketbook.'' 
It is idle to say that the obligation is not impaired. 
The entire essence and benefit thereof has been 
destroyed. 
A recognition of this practical result, which the 
Commission obviously intended and whi~h indeed is 
part and parcel of the new public policy which the Com-
mission is sponsoring, is implicit in the opinion of the 
Commission (R. 25) "that it is better public policy to 
have the citizens and rate payers conscious of all taxes 
being levied by the local municipalities. The Commis-
sion finds therefore that such taxes should be hilled 
separately and charged against the rate payers of the 
municipalities which levy such taxes.'' Obviously the 
citizens will not be "conscious of all taxes" unless they 
bear the burden thereof, and it is, of course, the express 
purpose and intent of the Commission that these citizens, 
formerly the beneficiaries of the tax, should now hear 
the burden thereof. It is utterly idle to contend that 
when a beneficiary has been converted into a burden 
carrier that there is no impairment of an obligation to 
furnish him with a benefit. 
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If it be arg-ed that the obligation runs to the muni-
cipal corporation, and not to the citizen-inhabitant 
stockholders, and that the obligation to the corporation 
bas not been impaired, the answer is three-fold. First, 
it is obYious that the corporation and its officers (the 
"public servants") in this case acted for and repre-
sented its inhabitants who are the real parties in interest, 
and, under the American rule, the third party beneficiary 
is recognized as the legal obligee. Second, no matter 
who is recognized as the obligee, the obligation of the 
Company is impaired. The City is entitled to look to 
its original obligor, and cannot be compelled to accept 
a novation with neu: obligors who will, as the Commis-
sion anticipates, immediately bring pressure and agitate 
for the cancellation of the obligation. Third, it is the 
established law of this state, and elsewhere, that ''a 
corporate entity may be entirely disregarded in order to 
reach and protect the real parties in interest, and to 
disclose the real transaction.'' 
See also 
Western Securities Co. vs. Spiro 62 Utah 
623, 221 Pac. 856, Syllabus 5. 
18 C. J. S. ''Corporations,'' section 6, pp. 
376-377, 
where it is said that: 
''It is clear that a corporation is in fact a 
collection of individuals, and that the idea of the 
corporation as a legal entity or person apart 
from its member is a mere fiction of the law in-
troduced for convenenience in conducting the 
business in this privileged way. It is now well 
settled, as a general doctrine, that, when this 
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fiction is urged to an intent not within its reason 
and purpose, it should be disregarded and the 
corporation considered as an aggregation of per-
sons, both in equity and at law .... The Courts 
will disregard the corporate fiction whenever 
its retention would produce injustices and in-
equitable consequences.'' 
See also 
62 c. J. s., pp. 68-69, 
where it is said that a municipal corporation may, and 
frequently does act as agent for its citizens, and is re-
garded as a trustee for its inhabitants. 
If ever there was a case where the corporate entity 
should be disregarded in the interests of justice, this 
is that case. The inhabitants of Ogden stand in grave 
danger of being unjustly deprived of the fruits of their 
grant of franchise privileges by the subterfuge of pay-
ing through their corporation, with their money, a debt 
beneficially owned by them. The corporate entity of 
their municipal corporation must not be permitted to 
stand between them and justice. 
The Company's obligation to the City's inhabitants 
is impaired by the Commission's order. 
As to the second objection raised by the Company 
to this point, we readily concede that it is general rule 
that Municipal Corporations cannot claim, as against 
the state, the protection of the ''impairment of abliga-
tions '' clauses. There are two clear replies by way of 
which the City avoids this admitted rule. 
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The first ha~ alr~ady hren ~uggested. 'l.,he real 
parties in interest here are the individual power con-
suming inhabitant~ of Ogden, in whose behalf the City 
here appears. Th~y are under no such disability. When 
the corporate fiction of the city is disregarded, as it 
must be here in the interest of justice, and the represen-
tative function of the city is recognized, the citizens of 
the city stand before the court unencumbered to claim 
their constitutional rights. The city claims these rights 
in their behalf, and with their support. Off the record, 
it is interesting to note that a number of rate payers in 
Ogden City have refused to pay the tax, thus putting 
the company in a most embarrassing position. It is 
also interesting to note, off the record, that Ogden City 
is now being billed as a consumer for a part of the 
franchise fee which the company is to pay to the City. 
Such is the anomalous position into which the Commis-
sion's order has forced the company against its will. 
And who with reason could say that when the city itself 
is billed for the franchise fee, that the obligation of the 
company to pay that fee to the city has not been im 
paired 1 Here is an exact and direct setoff and can-
cellation of the debt. 
The second reply is that the rule is based upon 
considerations which have no application in Utah to 
these facts. The reason behind the rule is that munici-
pal corporations are regarded as mere creatures of 
the state, whose very existence depends upon the whim 
of the state legislature which created them, and which 
can deprive them of any right, as it can deprive them 
of existence. 
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But that situation does not obtain in Utah, and 
especially in the case of Ogden City. In Utah under 
Article XII, Section 8 of the Constitution, the legisla-
ture cannot interfere with the City's franchise power. 
It might repeal the general laws under all cities (except 
Ogden) exist (Constitution, Article XI, Section 5 ), but 
so long as it allows them to exist as municipal corpora-
tions it cannot infringe their rights under the Consti-
tution to grant or withhold power company franchises, 
and impose conditions respecting the same. Only the 
people can do that, by constitutional amendment, and 
they have not acted. Only the Commission, the creature 
of the legislature has attempted to act, and it is elemen-
tary that the legislature cannot delegate to a commis-
sion, its creature, powers which it does not itself have. 
See 
See also 
16 C. J. S., pp. 344, note 61; 
339, note 14 (3); and 342, note 41. 
City of Columbus v. Public Utilities Com-
mission (Ohio, 1921) 133 N. E. 800, 
syllabi 26 to 31, 
holding that the legislature cannot delegate to the Public 
Utilities Commission power to nullify a City's franchise 
contract in violation of the Federal prohibition against 
impairing contract obligations. 
Furthermore, franchise negotiations under Article 
XII, Section 8, are clearly municipal functions which 
the Utah legislature is specifically prohibited from dele-
gating to any commission by the provisions of 
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Article VI, Sertion 29, of the Com,titutioll 
of Utah. 
rrhis court held in 
Union Pacific Railroad Company v. Public 
Service Commission, 
103 Utah 186, 200-203 
134 Pac. 2nd 469, 
that a city's power to grant franchises, and impose con-
ditions, is exclusive, and that no order of the Commis-
sion can reach or affect a city's rule made thereunder. 
It did not apply, however, the Constitutional prohibi-
tion; it held that the Legislature had not attempted 
to violate the restriction, and that the Commission is 
without statutory authority to regulate the terms of 
franchise contracts. The payment of the franchise fee 
by the Company, not the city's citizen beneficiaries, and 
the rendering of free service without direct charge to 
the citizen beneficiaries, are important and material 
conditions properly imposed by Ogden City upon the 
granting of the Franchise. The regulation of those con-
ditions is a city function, entirely beyond the scope of 
the Commission's authority. The Commission cannot, 
under the pretense of exercising its rate making power, 
meddle in exclusively city affairs. 
Furthermore, since Ogden in 1951 adopted the 
"Council-Manager Charter of Ogden City" pursuant to 
the Constitution, Article XI, Section 5, it is no longer 
deP.endent on the legislature for its corporate existence. 
It can no longer be abolished, or its rights impaired by 
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any act of the legislature or its creatures. The reason 
for a city's disqualification to claim constitutional pro-
tection against the legislature no longer applies to Ogden 
City. 
It is apparent that in Utah the Legislature has no 
power to meddle in Ogden's franchise contract, and can 
delegate no such power to the Commission. Therefore 
there is no reason why the City is not free, with respect 
to such contract, to claim the protection of the Consti-
tutional prohibitions against impairing the obligations 
of contracts. 
Perhaps it should be added that the rate making 
power, under the guise and pretense of which the Com-
mission proceeded here is a legislative function, covered 
by the constitutional restriction. 
43 Am. Jur. "Pub. Util." 
Section 83, p. 624-625. 
But it must be noted that what the Commission was 
actually trying to do, under this guise and pretense, was 
to regulate city franchise contracts. That will be de-
monstrated later in this brief. But that is obviously 
still a legislative function. 
The Order is void because it impairs the obligation 
of the Company's franchise contract with the City. 
POINT 5. The order of the Commission, by aruthor· 
izing a. specific and arbitrary setoff, releases and ex· 
tinguishes at least in part the indebtedness, liability and 
obligation of the company to the city under its fran-
chise contract in violation of Articile VI, Sections 27 
and 29 of the Constitution of Utah. 
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Article VT, Sertion :21, of the U tab Constitution 
provides that 
''The Legislature shall have no power to 
release or extinguish, in whole or in part, the 
indebtedness, liability, or obligation of any corp-
oration or person ..... to any municipal corpora-
tion ..... " 
Section 29 provides that 
''The Legislature shall not delegate to any 
special commission . . . . any power to make, 
supervise, or interfere with any municipal .... 
money, property, or effects, whether held in trust 
or otherwise, to levy taxes . . . or to perform 
any municipal functions.'' 
Here is a special protection for contract obligations 
owing to the city, if any is needed. Clearly, neither the 
legislature, nor (a fortiori) its creature, the Commis-
sion, may release the obligation to Ogden of the Com-
pany's City franchise contract. 
Yet that is exactly what the Commission has at-
tempted to do, as has been above demonstrated. lt has 
attempted to release the Company from obligation to the 
city and to impose in lieu thereof a new obligation upon 
Ogden City electric power consumers-including the 
city, for it uses more electiric power than the "free ser-
vice" affords. 
The case of 
St. George v. Public Utilities Commission 
63 Utah 43, 220 Pac. 720, 
is not in point. The contract there was not a franchise 
contract, protected also by Article XII, Section 8, but 
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was a contract for the sale of a municipal power plant for 
which the consideration, in part at least, was a agreement 
to furnish "free" city power for a term. There the Com-
mission ordered that the city be charged the regular 
power rates, but fixed and allowed as a credit against 
these power charges the value of the purchasing com-
pa.ny' s obligation to furnish ''free'' service for the term. 
Thus the form, and not the substance of the obligation 
was affected, and the Court approved, but even then 
Justice Gideon doubted the properiety of approving a 
"re-writing" of the City's sale contract. 
Here the exact reverse is true-the substance, and 
not the form of the obligation is affected. Here the Order 
of the Commission would absolutely cancel the Com-
pany's obligation, without providing any real compen-
satory benefit to the city and its inhabitants. It clearly 
violates the Constitutional prohibitions. 
POINT 6. The order of the Commission unlaw-
fully attempts to exercise power to supervise and inter-
fere with municipal money and property atnd to levy 
municipal functions which cannot lawfttlly be granted 
the Commission under Articile VI, Section 29 and Article 
XII, Section 8 of the Constitution of Utah. 
The order of the Commission as above demonstrated 
completely rewrites the franchise contract in its sub-
stance and effect. It changes the nature of the obliga-
tion from that of debtor to that of collection agent. It 
effects a novation by which the city's inhabitants who 
use electric power would be substituted as obligors in 
the place of the Company. This goes far beyond any 
mere change in form. A contract to grant a franchise 
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in return for serYice as the "collector" of a power use 
tax is quite a differet thing from a contract to grant a 
franchi~e in return for an annual payment by the Com-
pany of 2% of its gros~ receipts from local sales of elec-
tricity. There are obvious and cogent reasons why the 
latter is much more beneficial to the city and to its in-
habitants, and much to be preferred when negotiating a 
contract. The change is a very material change in the 
contract. 
Clearly the determinition of the consideration for 
and the conditions under which a franchise is to be 
granted are matteers of municipal policy. Clearly the 
determination of the amount of a city occupation tax 
and of the person upon whom the burden thereof shall 
be imposed, is a matter of municipal policy. Under the 
provisions of Section 5, Article XIII of the Constitu-
tion it can be exercised only by the municipal author-
ities. Neither function can under the Constitution he 
exercised either by the Legislature or by its creature, 
the Commission. The provisions of the Constitution 
of U tab, Article XII, Section 8, Article XIII, Section 
5 and Article VI, Section 29, forbid the Legislature or 
its Commission to meddle in these local affairs. The 
people framed our Constitution with unusual and far-
sighted wisdom apparently anticipated the growth of 
state as well as Federal bureaucracies and took precau-
tions to protect local government of the people against 
its encroachments. 
As above demonstrated under Point 1 of this brief 
matters of public policy and particularly matters of 
municipal policy are not for the Commission. 
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The fixing of the City's franchise terms and con-
ditions, as has been attempted by the Commission here, 
is purely and solely a municipal function entirely be-
yond the scope of the Commission's power. It is a func-
tion which the Legislature under the constitutional pro-
visions referred to could not, even if it would, delegate 
to the Commission. We submit that the Legislature 
has not attempted so to do. 
Again this "rewriting" of the franchise contracts, 
and this release of the company's obligation to the city 
and its inhabitants is an obvious and intolerable inter-
ference with the city's "municipal money, property and 
effects.'' It is a void attempt to exercise a power which 
the Legislature has not and could not delegate to the 
Commission and it is unconstitutional and void. 
That there may be no question, we call attention to 
the fact that in the case of 
Logan City vs. Public Utilities Commission 
72 Utah 536, 271 Pac. 961, 
this Court held that Article VI, Section 29 of the Cons-
titution applies to the Commission here. 
Again we must refer to the case of 
Union Pacific Railroad Company vs. Public 
Service Commission 
103 Utah 186, 134 Pac. 2nd 469, 
in which this Court held that under the provisions of 
Article XII, Section 8 of the Constitution the granting 
of a franchise and the imposition of condition precedent 
to the making of such grant are municipal functions 
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·with which the Commis~ion has and enn haY<: no con-
cern. This deeision clearly brings the case at Bar 
squarely within the prohibition of A rtic·le VI, Section 
29. The Commission in this case is assuming to exer-
cise authority which the Constitution forbids it to have. 
For these reasons also the Order of the Commis-
sion must be vacted. 
POINT 7. The order of the Commission unlawfully 
transforms a lawful and proper franchise fee exacted 
from the company into an unlawful tax on the purchase 
or use of electrical power in violation of Article VI, 
Section 29, Article XI, Section 5(a) and .Article XIII, 
Section 5 of 'the Constitution of Utah. 
In considering this point we must first direct the 
Court's attention spec.ifically to the exact provisions 
of the order of the Commission. The Commission di-
rected that the Company ''shall state on customer's 
bill and collect as a separate item ..... from its custo-
mers in any municipality wherein is imposed any muni-
cipay franchise . . . . . or licese tax. '' It must also be 
noted that the Commission's findings (R. 25) are, 
''That such taxes should be billed separately 
and charged against the rate pa.yers of the muni-
cipalities which levy such taxes.'' 
This is made ever more abundantly clear by the 
Commission's findings (R. 27) with respect to adjust-
ments in which it made the adjustment for franchise 
taxes by elimiatin.g them as an expense item. If more 
was needed to make the intention of the Commission 
absolutely clear, we need only to refer to Exhibit 40 
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(R. 838 to 896) approved by the Commission (R. 32) in 
which no provision is made for the collection of these 
taxes as revenues from the sale of power. 
Thus the Commission has made it clear that the 
tax money to be collected by the Company under its 
order is neither revenue nor expense and that it is not 
and cannot be considered as a charge for power ser-
vice rendered. The new schedules prescribe all of the 
charges to be made for power furnished and they do 
not include any part of the tax. On the contrary the 
tax is collected-as a tax-as a separate item. It is 
clear then that the Commission here has not even at-
tempted to disguise its action under the pretense of 
rate fixing, but has baldly ordered into effect its theory 
of public policy with respect to municipal franchise 
fees and license taxes. It will be remembered that 
the Missouri Commission at least had the grace to make 
a pretense that it was fixing rates, but our own Com-
mission has not thought it necessary to make even a 
pretense of confining itself within the limits of its 
authority. It has levied the Power Company license 
taxes and franchise fees directly upon the consumers 
as taxes and as franchise fees. 
It is noteworthy th~t the Commission is concerned 
with mechanisms to control city taxes and franchise fees 
and not with rate making. It will be recalled that the 
Commission declared that the present method "would 
encourage all cities served by applicant to levy as 
high a franchise tax as is possible . . . . '' Note also 
that the Commission states that it is of the opinion "that 
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it is better public policy to haYP the citizens and rate 
payers conscwns of t1ll ta."\:es being· levied by the local 
municipalities.·' 
Obviously and clearly the Commission is concern-
ing itself not with rates which are its province, but with 
municipal taxes which are forbidden to it by the Cons-
titution. 
'rhe effect of the order is that it cancels the fran-
chise and license taxes and levies in lieu thereof a city 
electric power sales or use tax on city subscribers. 
This clearly is in excess of the powers permitted 
by the Constitution to the Legislature or its delegatee 
Commission. 
By Article XIII, Section 5, of the Constitution the 
legislature is forbidden to levy any city, town or other 
municipal tax, but is authorized to vest power in the 
local authorities. So far it has never seen fit to vest 
the local authorities with power to levy sales, purchase 
or use taxes on the sale or purchase of any commodity 
or service. The Commission has rushed in where the 
local authorities themselves cannot tax. 
And Article VI, Section 29, forbids the legislature 
to delegate to the Commission the power to levy any 
taxes-but that has not restrained the Comission from 
the attempt. 
Ogden, as a charter city, derives its power to tax 
directly from Article XI, Section 5 (a) of the Consti-
tution-but here also the power granted is the "'power 
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prescribed by general law," and we know of no provi-
sion graning any municipality the right to levy a tax 
of the kind here attempted. 
We have found only one other case where this 
problem was involved. It is the Washington case of 
State vs. Department of Public Service 
142 Pac. 498, 535. 
The court makes no attempt to analyze the practi-
cal result, but merely declares that 
''There is no basis for the argument ad-
vanced by the cities that the department is seek-
ing to exercise the taxing power, or to interfere 
with the exercise of that power by the cities. The 
only question concerns the allocation of the mo-
neys paid by respondent to the cities under a tax-
ing ordinance or pursuant to franchise provisionR 
" 
Nor does it appear from that decision that there 
the Order in question ''passed on'' the tax as tax, as 
was attempted here. On the contrary that Order merely 
increased rates for service in an amount sufficient to 
compensate the Company for its cost in municipal ta~es 
in each city. The case is therefore distinguishable on 
this point. The court says, 
''We are of the opinion that the Department, 
insofar as such taxes are concerned, has the power 
to fix special excharnge rates . . . which will in 
effect requires the rate payers in each community 
to absorb a sum equal to the amount of the tax 
..... More than this the department cannot do." 
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The case was· remanded for further proceedings. It 
would seem that the court was authorizing a bona fide 
fixing of rates on a local, rather than on a state wide 
basis, and presumably the department in its further 
proceedings would take evidence on all the factors neces-
sary to fix fair rates on a local rather than state-wide 
basis. The case is not in point on the question of the 
effect of '• passing on'' the tax as an exercise of tax 
power by the Commission. 
No matter what may have been the fact as to the 
nature of the action taken by the Washington State 
Commission which was the subject of the decision of the 
W ashingion Court, in this case it is very clear that the 
Utah Commission has here attempted to levy a tax, as a 
tax upon the consumers of electrical power, and this 
it cannot do. 
In this connection, off the record, it is interest-
mg to note that the Federal Government has refused 
to pay this 2% tax on power delivered for its use with-
in the cities in question upon the ground that the Fed-
eral Government is not subject to any tax by any state 
or local authority. Again it must be observed that the 
Commission has saddled the Company with an un-
wanted and impossible task. 
Inasmuch as the order of the Commission is an 
unauthorized and unlawful attempt to exercise taxing 
power and unlawful attempt to exercise taxing power 
and to interfere with the exercise of the taxing power 
by the authorities vested therewith it is void and must 
be set aside. 
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POINT 8. The only case approviJng the pass1ng 
on. of a franchise fee is distinguishable. __ The other 
cases support the city's position. 
As we have before stated, there are only three 
cases by courts of last resort which consider the problem 
created by an order of a public service commission re-
quiring a utility to ''pass on'' municipal franchise fees 
and license taxes. 
The first case to be decided was the Illinois case of 
City of Elmhurst vs. Western United Gas 
Company (Ill., 1936) 
1 Northwestern 2nd 144. 
That case involved a schedule of rates filed by the de-
fendant utility which had general application through-
out the utility's northern district except as to five 
municipalities. In those cities the company was auth-
orized to add to its uniform charges for gas service 
a ''percentage differential sufficient to meet the 
annual payments which the Company is required to pay 
each of the five municipalities" by virtue of the fran-
chise ordinances. The City of Elmhurst asked to have 
this differential eliminated. The Illinois Statute 
generally prohibited unreasonable differences as to rates 
as between localities and forbids discrimination. It 
further empowered the commission to consider one or 
more nvunicipalities as a regional unit, either with or 
without the adjacent or intervening rura.Z territory 
and in such unit to prescribe uniform rates for customers 
of the same class. The Illinois Court held that under 
this statute, the commission did not act unlawfully in 
classifying the franchise municipalities as separate units 
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and making differentials equal to the differences 
in franchise fees. This is a situation quite different 
from the situation in the rase at Bar, for here we have 
no statute authorizing the isolation of a single city as 
a rate unit, but our statute requires rates to be fair 
and uniform throughout the state for equal service. 
:Jioreover, in the Illinoi8 case the court observed 
that ''no question is raised as to the fairness or uniform-
ity of the basic rate in the territory served." In this 
case the only evidence before the commission, which is 
certainly in accord with reason and general knowledge, 
is that the expenses incident to serving the franchise 
cities are less, and if any rate differential is to be estab-
lished, the inhabitants of these cities are entitled to the 
benefit of this lower cost. In this case the positive 
testimony is that if various areas are to be segregated 
and considered separately, the company's customers 
outside the franchise and taxing cities benefit at the 
expense of the customers within those cities. Thus it 
is apparent that the facts before this court differ 
materially from the facts before the Illinois Court, and 
arguments based upon these factual differences are 
pressed here which were not pressed upon the Illinois 
Court. 
Again, in the Illinois case the Court remarks that 
the city alone receives the advantage of the annual 
payment of a franchise fees. That is a fact entirely 
contrary to the evidence in the case at Bar, for here 
the evidence is that the privilege of doing business in 
the franchise and taxing cities results in a material 
financial benefit to the customers of the company out-
side the city limits. 
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The Illinois ease is for these reasons distinguishable 
from the case at Bar and does not support the ruling 
of the Utah Commission. If it were not distinguishable, 
it is submitted that it is wrong on reason and should 
not be followed. 
It should also be commented that the Illinois Court 
states badly, without any analysis or consideration of 
the problem, that the order of the Illinois Commission 
did not interfere with the franchise contract, and that 
the order of the commission did not contravene the 
constitutional inhibition against the impairment of con-
tracts. We are not advised upon what arguments and 
considerations the Illinois Court based this conclu-
sion. Certainly the court's failure to carefully consider 
the problem and outline the basis for its conclusion 
lessens the respect to which the opinion would otherwise 
be entitled. However, here again the Illinois case is 
distinguishable on this point, because as the court will 
have observed, the Illinois Commission merely author-
ized an increase in some of the city consumers rates 
sufficient to raise the amount necessary to pay the 
franchise tax. It did not pass on the tax as a tax to 
the consumer and thus relieve the utility ·of any obli-
gation to pay the tax. Under the Illinois ruling the 
commission would still have to receive the differential 
as income from charges for service and would have to 
show the payment of the tax as an expense. Under the 
Utah Commission's order that is not the case. The 
Company in Utah will no longer pay the tax itself but 
will act as a collecting agent from the consumers. This 
is obviously a differenee in substance and not merely in 
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form. Here again it i~ submitted that if the Illinois 
case is not distinguishable on the facts, then it would 
be wrong in principle and should not be followed. 
The second case in which this problem was 
considered is 
State YS. Department of Public Service 
(Washington, 1943,) 
142 Pac. 2nd 498, 532, 536 (Syllabi 42 
to 45'. 
In that case the Supreme Court of Washington had 
under consideration an order of the Washington Depart-
ment of Public Service approving rate schedules for a 
telephone utility by which the rates in municipalities 
were made to vary sufficiently to permit the company 
to recover within each municipality the amount of fran-
chise fees charged by each city for the use of its streets 
and the amount of license or occupation taxes. The 
court there held that the Department of Public service 
lacked legal authority to direct or permit the telephone 
company to pass franchise fee payments along to rate 
payers within the respective franchise granting cities. 
It pointed out that franchise fees were payments made 
for benefits received and that a franchise is in the 
nature of a contract. It pointed out that taxes on the 
other hand are exactions made by the government under 
governmental authority for the purpose of defraying 
governmental costs and expenses. The Washington 
Court concluded that the Department of Public Service 
there, insofar as occupation taxes were concerned, had 
the power to fix special exchange rates applicable to the 
different communities, which would in effect require the 
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rate payers in each community ''to absorb a sum equal 
to the amount of the tax which respondent is required 
to pay to that municipality. More than this the depart-
ment cannot do.'' This ruling was based upon an as-
sumption apparently made by the Washington Court 
and Department for the court said, 
"Manifestly there is an element of unjust 
discrimination in allowing one community to levy 
and collect from respondent or any public utility 
engaged in business throughout the state an 
occupation tax which in turn the utility would 
colle-ct by a state-wide increase in rates.'' 
r:rhe evidence in this case negatives this point made 
by the Washington Court, because the evidence here 
is that urban areas are cheaper to serve and give a 
financial benefit to the rural areas which franchise fees 
or business license taxes tend to equalize. In the case 
at Bar the franchise taxes are then an equalizing factor 
rathe,r than a factor creating unjust discrimina-
tion. The case at Bar, as to license taxes, is distinguish-
able on the facts from the Washington case. 
The Washington case then clearly is authority in 
support of the position of plaintiff in the case at Bar 
as to franchise fees, and is distinguishable with respect 
to the license tax levied by South Salt Lake. It is 
interesting to note that the Washington Court both crit-
icized and distinguished the Elmhurst case insofar as 
it applied to franchise fees. 
We have already distinguished the Washington 
case insofar as it bears on the question of interfer-
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enee by the Commission with the taxing and franchise 
granting powers and prerogatives of the municipal 
authorites. 
The third case which has been previously decided 
by courts of last resort is, of course, the ·Missouri case of 
State YS. Public Service Commission 
(Missouri, 1952) 
2-!5 S. W. 2nd 851. 
This case we have previously discussed 1n detail. It 
is plainly exactly in point here and in favor of the 
position of the plaintiff city both as to franchise fees 
and as to license taxes. 
It thus appears that as to the authorities considering 
this question the only cases which have reached a result, 
contrary to the one here con tended for, are distinguish-
able and other authority supports the plaintiff's position. 
On the authorities considered the order of the commis-
sion should be vacated and set aside. 
CONCLUSION 
This case and the companion case of Ogden City 
vs. Public Service Commission, No. 7884, recently argued 
and submitted to the court are, we believe, of great and 
paramount importance. The issues involved are much 
larger than the mere question of who shall ultimately 
bear the burden of a franchise fee or license tax. Indeed 
that minor question is one which never can be solved 
ultimately, because as a matter of fact each person who 
pays that tax must in turn pass it on in his charges for 
goods or labor to the persons he served who in turn must 
pass it on again. And the circle in a civilized com-
munity is endless. 
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The paramount question at stake here is the question 
of local self-governmet. In this case the Commission has 
challenged the very constitutional foundations of local 
self-government which is so characteristic of our Amer-
ican civilization. This challenge should be thrown back. 
It is respectfully submitted that on reason and on 
authority the Commission below acted illegally, arbit-
rarily and capriciously, and in excess of its jurisdiction 
in entering the order requiring the company to pass on 
the tax to its consumers within the franchise and 
taxing cities, and that order should be vacated. 
Respectfully submitted, 
PAUL THATCHER 
1018 First Security Bank Building 
Ogden, Utah 
JACK A. RICHARDS 
Eccles Building 
Ogden, Utah 
CHARLES A. SNEDDON 
Eccles Building 
Ogden, Utah 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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